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Abstract
A century ago, Einstein (1919) distinguished between two kinds of theory - theories of principle, and construc-
tive theories. These have separate but complementary roles to play in the advancement of knowledge, in
the manner in which they relate to data, and how they are developed. The dierent kinds of theory carry
implications for what kinds of data we produce, and how they are put to use. We outline Einstein’s distinction
and themodel of theory formation that it involves. We thenuse the distinction to look at someof the discussion
of scientific practice in psychology, particularly recent work on the need for more theoretical, rather than
purely methodological, sophistication. We argue in agreement with Einstein that the distinction is a useful
one, and that adopting it as a tenet of theoretical development requires a renewed commitment to a natural
history of psychology.
Keywords: scientific practice, theories of principle, constructive theories, natural history, exploratory research
1 Introduction
Within the broad discussion on scientific practice in psychological research currently underway
there is an increasingly explicit recognition that not just our methods, but also our theories need a
greater degree of sophistication. Szollosi and Donkin (2019a) note that recent discussion of the
theoretical aspects of reforms to scientific practice was at first relegated to less formal channels of
communication (commentaries and blogposts, such as Borsboom, 2013; Carsel, Demos, & Motyl,
2018; Seymour, 2019; van Rooij, 2019; Wilson, 2011), but is now increasingly represented in pre-
print and traditional article publications (Gray, 2017; Muthukrishna & Heinrich, 2019; Oberauer &
Lewandowsky, 2019; Szollozi & Donkin, 2019a,b). Criticisms of theory development in psychology
are nothing new – there is a decades long tradition of it (Dar, 1987; Dewsbury, 2009; Gigerenzer,
1998; Lykken, 1991; Meehl, 1978). The present discussion, embedded as it is within the broader
considerations of professional reforms, however, carry aweight that previous eorts have appeared
to lack. The literature on these considerations of theory at present tend to focus on their variability
(Szollosi & Donkin, 2019a,b), logical coherence (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019; Muthukrishan
& Heinrich, 2019) and adequate explication (Gray, 2017). We agree with these arguments. The
characteristics of theories aect the ways in which data carry implications for them, and this in
turn aects how we should form hypotheses, what data we generate to test them, and what kinds
of techniques we use to interpret those data.
In the rest of this paperweargue that a valuable addition to this reflectionon theorywouldbe to step
back and examine what kinds of theory there are. Theories do not form a homogeneous category.
Rather, there are dierent kinds of theories which can be deployed in science for distinct purposes,
and fromwhich we draw implication for our understanding and valuing of various methods and
the data that they produce. To illustrate this theoretical diversity we introduce a simple distinction
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first described explicitly by Einstein, and explore some of the implications of this distinction, and
recommendations that follow from it for the improvement of psychological research practices.
2 Two Kinds of Theory
In 1919, in a letter to the Times of London, Albert Einstein distinguished between two dierent kinds
of scientific theory. He claimed that most are “constructive theories”, in which models of reality are
constructed from simple propositions concerning hypothesized components. Einstein’s example
here was the kinetic theory of gases, which explains themeasured temperature and pressure of
gases in a container on the basis of the movements of molecules of the gas. We understand a
phenomenon when we have a constructive theory which encompasses it, and the theory enables
an eective coordination of our actions with the phenomena in question (accurate prediction, and
perhaps some form of control). We can see that insofar as this is the case, then the development of
eective, useful, and comprehensive constructive theory is the proper work of a mature science.
In psychological research, when theorizing is done explicitly it tends to be of this kind, focusing on
hypothesized components and the means by which they might give rise to behavior observed in
controlled conditions. The repudiation of a simplistic behaviorist attitude that many of us learn in
our undergraduate studies ensures that from the beginning of our careers the target of our science
is the adequate description of mechanisms that are typically not directly observable ormeasurable,
but which underlie things observed andmeasured.
The second form of theory described by Einstein is what he termed “theories of principle”. Theories
of principle are those generalizations from observations that are elegant, accurate, and useful
descriptions of thenaturalworld captured in thoseobservations. Einstein (1919) notes thatNewton’s
theory of universal gravitation and his own theories of special and general relativity fall into this
category. Theories of principle do not provide accounts of mechanisms. They do not begin from a
specified set of hypothesized components, but rather are developed on the basis of abductively
identified principles. From these principles, then, descriptions of other key facets of the world
can be derived. From a diversity of observations the scientist conjectures key relationships that
characterize the phenomena of interest, and with those conjectures fixed as principles, further
details can be analytically deduced (Holton, 1979). They are eective insofar as they are pure,
logical, and secure in their foundation in empirical data (Einstein, 1919).
The special and general theories of relativity fix the speed of light, not on the basis of an explanation
for it, but multiple empirical demonstrations. Having identified this fact as one of a set of basic
principles, however, Einstein was able to get a surprising amount of work done in describing
relationships between phenomena in the universe without oering any mechanistic account of
how those relationships arise. The theory of relativity, for instance, famously predicts changes in
mass and a slowing of time as bodies accelerate, limited by the speed of light. There is no mention
made of the means by which mass and time change. Their relationship is captured by the theory
in a way that has allowed for more than a century of accurate predictions, with no account as to
precisely how it all works. There is no equivalent in relativity to the kinetic theory of gases, which
explains how temperature and pressure are produced via the movements of molecules. The “how”
of relativity remains an outstanding challenge for physicists, but it is a challenge with very clearly
defined parameters.
The variant characteristics of these two kinds of theory give them dierent strengths and dierent
roles to play in the development of our knowledge. A better understanding of these dierences
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will help us see both the value of them, and the implications that they hold for howwe go about
producing data to inform them.
2.1 Complementary theories supporting advancement of knowledge
Felline (2011) describes theories of principle as capturing the “structural” aspects of the phenomena
of interest. That is to say that theories of principle provide accounts of the relationships andpatterns
that exist in descriptions of the world, rather than descriptions of the mechanisms that give rise to
those relationships. They oer these descriptions, however, in the formal terms of the scientific
discipline (in Einstein’s case, those terms are substantially mathematical). The perception and
understanding of these patterns might arise from extensive observations and tabulations of data,
introducing new concepts and ways of thinking that help organize existing observations (as in the
case of Newton’s theory of universal gravitation). Theymight re-orient the scientific community
around these new patterns, in response to challenges or confusions regarding them (as was the
case with Einstein’s theory of relativity). In focusing on the structural aspects of things, theories
of principle make few ontological commitments (or as few as possible). Some (perhaps Einstein
included; Balashov & Jansson, 2003, p.332) consider theories of principle to be the inferior form of
theory - they provide description more than explanation. But they still have a powerful role to play
in scientific endeavor.
Firstly, they oer what Felline (2011) calls “structural explanations”, models which explain the
behavior of some part of the system in terms of its relationships to other parts of themodel, without
necessarily specifying how those relationships arise from theproperties of theparts themselves (see
also Lange, 2014). Secondly, having identified the principles on the basis of patterns in the observed
phenomena, predictions that follow from those principles can be deduced. Indeed, Einstein’s letter
to the Times was prompted by the so-called Eddington Experiment. The Eddington Experiment,
organizedbyArthur StanleyEddingtonandFrankWatsonDyson, involvedmeasurementsof starlight
deflectionmade during a solar eclipse on either side of the Atlantic (Brasil on the west and Principe
on the east). The measurements were to test predictions made by Einstein as early as 1911, and
which were posited as direct tests of general relativity in 1915. A final, and perhaps most important
role for theories of principle is in specifying the relationships between chosen components of an
observed system in the formal terms of the discipline, theories of principle impose constraints on
constructive theories (Flores, 1999; Einstein 1919).
If the theory of principle is a good one, then any constructive theory in the domain will have to
encompass it, and should not make any predictions that violate those principles. In this way, the
theory of principle becomes the representative of natural settings within experimental laboratory
work. The theory of principle can help identify research questions, set research agendas, and
by setting constraints, support the evaluation of competing constructive theories. Einstein’s own
theory of general relativity has performed such functionswithin the domain of cosmological physics
for the better part of a century (once it came to be accepted by the scientific community at large).
Good theories of principle are therefore somewhat the more stable of the two kinds, not being
beholden to the specific ontological or mechanistic commitments required of constructive theories
(Felline, 2011; Balashov & Jansson, 2003, suggest this is partly what drew Einstein to the form of
theory which he considered technically inferior). Constructive theories, however, provide descrip-
tions and explanations at a higher degree of resolution more in tune with the highest aspirations of
science. Bluntly summarizing, Balashov and Jansson (2003) claim that constructive theories are
about the underlying reality, while theories of principle are about the phenomena.
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This complementary relationship between theories of principle and constructive theories oers a
division of labor in science that can play an important role in structuring and coordinating diverse
research agendas. Theories of principle, where shown to be accurate in their descriptions of the
world, provide an agreed set of criteria by which otherwise varied constructive approaches can
be assessed, an arena within which they can be compared directly. The theory of principle is
the formalized surrogate of the natural world used to inform and evaluate studies in controlled
environments.
In having dierent roles to play in scientific practice, the dierent kinds of theory have somewhat
dierent criteria by which they should be judged, and also, crucially, dierent relationships to
data. It is this latter aspect in particular that we argue holds some important implications for the
priorities of contemporary psychological research.
2.2 Dierent kinds of theories have dierent relationships with data
As noted above, Einstein describes theories of principle as being evaluated by the soundness of
their logic, coherence, and the security of their foundation in data. This foundation in data is worth
dwelling on for a moment.
Einstein describes the principles being first identified in a conjecture born of familiarity with the
“multiplicity” of sense experience. Theories of principle are thus developed abductively. The data
which inspire such leaps of intuition are varied, general. Einstein wants to, as much as possible,
encompass the “totality of sense experiences” (Holton, 1979, p.313; see also Einstein in Schilpp,
1949). The variety and generality of these data are crucial. For the integrating conjecture that is
vital to Einstein’s formation of a theory to have validity, it must attempt to encompass this totality.
We have already noted that a theory of principle should make as few ontological commitments as
possible. Though observations or measurements that are wholly theory-free are impossible, each
prior theoretical commitmentmeans that a constructive theory (whether implicit or explicit) already
plays a role in its structure. Each such commitment narrows the field of experience that can possibly
be encompassed by the theory when developed. Laboratory practice is perforce structured by
prior theory - every decision made with regard to method, material, and measurement, represents
the researcher’s informed perspective. Opportunities for serendipity and surprise are far from
eliminatedbut they are bydefinition limitedby controlled settings. The totality andmultiplicitywith
which the researcher engages in a form of “free play” (Einstein in Schilpp, 1949, p.7) is constrained
in advance.
For a theory of principle to be broadly valid, then, it must draw not only on data drawn from the
laboratory, but also from less structured, though still disciplined, observations of phenomena
“in the wild.” Einstein for his part had a wealth of relevant information available to him, both
from the laboratory and from the observations of the natural movements of heavenly and earthly
bodies. His theories made sense of a “labyrinth of sense impressions”, a “totality of empirical
fact” (Holton, 1979, p.313, citing Einstein, 1954). This might be something we can easily imagine
of Einstein; it’s something of a tall order for the rest of us. Nevertheless, we see here a call not
only to ambition, but to a re-balancing of our scientific practices, particularly our data production
techniques, in order to facilitate the development of better theories of principle. In the context of
the wide-ranging disciplinary discussion on the professional practices of research psychologists,
our methods and approaches, it behooves us to recognize that the prescriptions for improvements
in scientific practice will depend on the question of “improvements for what purpose?” Where a
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need for dierent forms of theoretical progress is identified, then dierent kinds of data will need
to be produced accordingly, and the more explicit and aware we are of these dierent aspirations,
the better we will manage them.
Several of the criticisms of psychology’s poor theoretical state concern the lack of an integrative or
over-arching framework (Borsboom, 2013; Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019; Wilson, 2011). Muthukr-
ishna and Henrich (2019) explicitly suggest a theory that addresses mechanisms of development
and change as oering such a framework, but if Einstein is correct then this is putting the cart
before the horse. The encompassing framework is more likely to be, in the first instance, a theory
of principle rather than a constructive one - descriptive rather than explanatory.
Where a theory of principle is sought, it becomes important for us to understand the role and
value of observations of our phenomena of interest outside of the lab, in the “psychologist-free
environment of behavior” (Barker, 1968, p.4; with recognition of the necessary irony that such
attempts would involve). If we are to develop descriptive but principled accounts of the structure
and pattern of relationships between key aspects of our science, wemust seek these patterns in the
wild before we can hope to consistently produce them in the laboratory. Where the development
of a theory of principle is considered a valid and useful eort for psychology, we will have to spend
more time than we have done gathering information on the naturally occurring behavior of human
beings in our natural habitat. Before looking at this process in the context of psychology, let us
briefly consider its value where it has a richer history, that of biology.
3 The Value of Observations in the Natural World
In developing his theories of principle, Einstein (like Newton before him) was able to draw on a
wealth of observations andmeasurements of the phenomena of interest as they unfolded within a
natural or uncontrolled environment. In the case of astronomy, for instance, these observations
are tabulated by observatories, nowwith centuries of systematic collection of such data. The world
of living systems is much more complex, yet open-minded, sensitive observations of it have played
amuch-lauded role in the form of natural history (Bates, 1950; Fleischner, 2011).
As with many such phrases, there is no single definition in universal use, though there is a general
consensus around the concept in broad terms. Researchers speak, for instance, of a “kind of
close, scrupulous observation of nature” (Wilcove & Eisner, 2000, B24), or “the observation and
description of the natural world” (Tewksbury et al., 2014, p.300), “a practice of intentional, focused
attentiveness and receptivity to the more-than-human world, guided by honesty and accuracy”
(Fleischner, 2011, pp. 5-6). Bates (1950/2014, p.7) describes natural history as “the study of life at
the level of the individual - of what plants and animals do, how they react to each other and their
environment, how they are organized into larger groupings like populations and communities.”
This interest in patterns and relationships, particularly between individuals and their environments,
is also an important theme. Wilcover andEisner (2000, B24) notenatural history as involving a “close
observation of organisms - their origins, their evolution, their behavior, and their relationships with
other species.” Tewksbury et al. (2014, p.300) note the study of “organisms and their linkages to the
environment being central” to the idea. Sunderland, Klitz, and Yoshihara (2012, p.826) point out
that though natural history is oen associated simply with the collection of specimens, field notes
on context, prevalence, behavior, surrounding vegetation, weather, and landscape, are crucial to
the naturalist’s practice. The surrounding habitat is considered an essential component of the
description of the animal (even if it’s a little harder to transport back to the specimen cupboard).
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Natural history is a rich practice that provides descriptions of the broader contours and structures
within which more mechanistic theories of biological processes are framed. Bartholomew (1986,
pp.326-327) claims that “information provided by natural history will always be the touchstone
for synthesis (biological significance)”, arguing that it is only in the context oered from natural
historical accounts that knowledge becomes biological, as opposed to chemical or physical. Sun-
derland et al. (2014) similarly note that natural history and various experimental and theoretical
wings of biological sciences (molecular biology, physiology, morphology, theoretical biology and
many others) are mutually dependent.
Among natural history’s various aspects, given our interest in the development of theories of
principle here, wemight focus on two key points:
1. The cataloging of prevalences and event frequencies in the natural world
2. The identifying of relationships between dierent kinds of events, and between organisms and
their environments in natural settings.
A range of extant methods might be involved in these two undertakings - from narrative descrip-
tions, to imaging of various kinds, video or audio recording, or the use of observational checklists
and similar structured surveys of natural settings. This disciplining of observations forms the
backbone to the process of formalization of descriptions of the phenomena that are essential to the
development of a theory of principle for a given domain, as Einstein has described it. This is not to
say that such theories are built only from observations of the natural world. We have already noted
that both Einstein and Newton, for example, also drew frommore controlled observations. The
richness of naturalistic data is vital, however. As He (2018) argues, natural history requires not just
an open-minded, descriptive mode, but an ecosystems perspective, one that explicitly records the
event or specimen in context in a way that retains important data about the relationship between
the phenomenon of interest and the web of related phenomena in which it naturally occurs. While
we agree with He, it is worth noting that the concept of the ecosystem itself is one of biology’s
theories of principle, a descriptive and organizing concept that helps structure other investigations.
It was derived and refined over time by a series of biologists, most notably Humboldt (Anderson,
2017; Wulf, 2015), but refined by a number of subsequent researchers, typically on the basis of yet
more data produced through the process of natural history.
At present, the discipline of psychology largely lacks for such naturalistic data. In the typical
story many of us learn as undergraduates, the proper founding of the discipline is taken to be the
dedication of laboratory space on either side of the Atlantic in the late 1870’s, and there has been a
strong emphasis on observation in carefully controlled settings ever since. Historians of psychology
have noted that psychologists have standardized aroundmethods that typically value laboratory
investigations over work in natural settings (Danziger, 1994; Green, 2015; Stam, 2004). This has been
to theextent thatDanziger (1994, p.45) describesdevelopments in the early decadesof thediscipline
as a “repudiation of Wundt”, who argued vehemently for the need for balance between controlled
and naturalistic observations, through the practices of what he termed volkerpsychologie (oen
translated as cultural, or folk psychology).
The definition of psychology by the founding of laboratories sets the discipline apart from other
sciences,wherenatural history and laboratorypracticewove in andout of oneanother as theirmeth-
ods developed (Anderson, 2017). Indeed, they continue to do so, even as some researchers raise
concerns that the emphasis has swung too far away from naturalistic observation (Bartholomew,
1986; Sunderland, Klitz, & Yoshihara, 2012). The same cannot be said of psychology, which appears
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to have more or less skipped what wemight call the “butterfly collection” phase of its scientific
development, in our haste to identify ourselves as properly experimental science (Barker, 1968).
He (2001, 2018) and Morris (2009) point out that though there are some exceptions to this general
rule, field work of the kind that can be termed natural history remains very rare, and not very
influential within psychological research. This is not to suggest that it does not occur at all, but
its role within the discipline is under-valued and unsystematic. Such research tends to already
be conducted within already rich theoretical frameworks and has little systematic role in the
identification of patterns and relationships proper to natural history (He, 2018).
True to the historical development of the science, the majority of psychological researchers begin
their careers in the laboratory and tend to stay there. Where research is conducted in natural
settings, it is oen in the form of intervention or implementation science, such that the kinds of
aims served by the activities of natural history cannot be achieved (He, 2018).
We argue that this dearth of naturalistic observation is one of the most serious challenges to the
emergence of theories of principle, which in turn means that our theoretical sophistication and
scientific practice remain weaker than they could and should be.
A natural history of psychology is diicult, but there are some significant positive examples available
for us to work with. Descriptive observation of human behavior in the wild is not only possible,
it is currently conducted in a number of sub-fields of the discipline in focused ways (examples
abound in social psychology, developed from the work of Garfinkel, 1967, Sacks, 1992, and others;
naturalistic recording is also relatively well represented in developmental studies, such as He,
1979, 1988, Jayaraman, Fausey, & Smith, 2015; Karasik, Tamis-LeMonda, & Adolph, 2011; Karasik,
Tamis-LeMonda, Adolph, & Bornstein, 2015; Rossmanith, Costall, Reichelt, López, & Reddy, 2014).
Without question the richest resource for a natural history of psychology is thework of Roger Barker,
Louise Shedd Barker, Herbert Wright, Phil Schoggen, and their colleagues, who conductedmore
than twenty-five years of field work in a small town in rural Kansas, work that is as impressive as it
is unknown.
In a reflection at the end of his career Barker (1979) described an experience of shock, a “negative
‘Aha!’” (p.2150), during a journey as the train he was on stopped in numerous small towns through
rural Illinois in the United States. Despite being an expert in human behavior he had little idea
beyond his own common sense as to what actually happened, day in, day out, in these various
places. Moving to the University of Kansas, he, Louise Shedd Barker, a zoologist, and a cadre of
graduate students, set up a field research station in the town of Oskaloosa (referred to in their
research as “Midwest”). Over a period of twenty-five years (from 1948 to 1973, when the Midwest
Psychological Field Station closed), they went from observing every activity of a small group of
children, to recording data onmany dierent settings of people’s activities within the public spaces
of the town, as well as comprehensive assessments of the various resources the town provided
for those activities. The result is a striking body of work which identifies some deeply important
relationships between human behavior and physical and social environments in which they take
place.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to oer anything other than a few breadcrumbs to lead the
reader to this work (see He, 2001, Chapter 7; Barker, 1968; Schoggen, 1989), though the primary
results of it, the theory of behavior settings, is perhaps a prime candidate for a theory of principle
for behavior. Years of extensive recording and cataloging of behavior enabled the group to identify
patterns, relationships, and structures that oered significant insights into psychology. For the
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moment, suice it to point out that if we have an interest in predicting behaviors, and have access
only to a single piece of information about a person, then by far the most valuable datumwe can
seek is “what setting are they in?” In an o-used phrase to summarize the idea “When in church,
people behave church; in school, people behave school.” Behavior tends to varymorewithin people
across settings, than between people within settings.
Psychological researchers have a tendency, remarked upon by Barker (1968, p.4) and largely un-
changedsince, toeither take complete control of theenvironment (through theprovisionof stimulus
packages in blandly painted and sparely furnished laboratories) or treat the environment as being
probabilistically structured, a statistical puzzle to solve. These are understandings of the relation-
ship between people and their environments that do not survive an eort aer natural history,
and observation of the highly structured, nested character of settings for behavior in the human
habitat.
Barker andhis colleagues developeda richbodyof theory derived from their observational research,
one that oers substantial return on the investment in getting to know it. But it is work that has
seen little replication, and surprisingly sparse study by researchers outside of the original research
group. We should note explicitly, however, that some of the Midwest work, particularly that with
regards to the population (and under-population) of behavior settings has been examined by others
(e.g. Wicker, 1978), but the extensive naturalistic data gathering remains an outlier in the field.
This appears to have been due to a number of factors, but largely lack of available funding and
constraints of professional incentives which run counter to slow careful descriptive work (Scott,
2005).
The Midwest team did not set out to develop a theory of principle. Their data collection eorts
were not all purely descriptive, and in making sense of the dynamics of behavior settings they
deploy a host of accounts of mechanism and other characteristic of constructive theories. Both
early and later articulations of the theory include reference to “circuits” of various kinds that initiate,
progress, andmaintain the setting during its existence. The discovery of behavior settings in and of
itself, however, is the advancement of a theory based on what Barker described as “atheoretical,
phenomena-centered” (1978, p.46) observations, not built from the hypothesized components of
individual human behavior. The mechanisms advanced by Barker (1968), Schoggen (1989) and
others comes subsequent, constructive theories attempting to respond to the demands of the
principle theory.
The team’s various publications provide extensive information on their methods of observation,
recording, and analysis, but all conducted in a small rural town, and with an emphasis on the
“molar” level of description - behavior in its contours rather than its fine details, a decision made
for reasons of practicality and to address an apparent gap in psychological research generally
(Barker, 1968). These methods oer the potential for the creation of rich and important corpuses of
behavioral data, but only if the value and purpose of it can be imagined by psychological scientists
and their funders. It is slow work, demanding substantial investments of time in particular. Modern
recording technologies will no doubt allow for some work to be divided in ways it has typically not
been, but only if we canmanage to pick our way carefully through the ethical challenges and legal
complications of doing so. It is worth remarking, though, that these are the primary obstacles for
the conduct of research that can in principle be conducted with nothing more than patience, care,
a notebook, and pencil.
We have noted that one purpose of natural history is to provide descriptions of the naturally
occurring phenomena of a scientific domain. Natural histories enable scientists to understand the
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relative frequency of particular kinds of occurrences, in order to evaluate how representative their
controlled studies are of ordinarily occurring events (Bartholomew, 1986; Bates, 1950; Brunswik,
1947, makes similar observations relevant to psychology). This would also mean for psychology
developing a clearer picture of the diversity, the range and variability, of behavior and mental
life, something it is surprisingly diicult to do from our extant body of theory (see the preface to
Barker et al, 1978, for an enlightening outlining of this issue). Additionally, natural histories can be
conducted at varying levels of description (somewhat in contrast to laboratory experiments, where
the focus is on a very narrow range of temporal and spatial scales for behavior). In doing so, they
allow us to look at not just the relative frequency, but the relationships in time and space, between
dierent phenomena of interest to the discipline as they occur in the environment not under the
control of the psychologist.
For instance, a natural history of cognition would enable us to form descriptions, and then hypothe-
ses, about the importance of places in the emergence and development of cognitive functions in
normal settings (Barker, 1968; Klein, 1993; Schoggen, 1989). It would also enable the examination
of patterns of behaviors (cognitive, social, emotional), over the course of minutes, hours, days, or
longer, which could oer us opportunities to perceive, hypothesize, and ultimately test theories
about, relationships between dierent aspects of behavior or mental activity.
We believe that a more refined understanding of dierent kinds of theory and their complementary
roles in the development of science oers oneway to articulate the importance of such eorts. Alas,
our discipline’s blindness to distinctions between, and distinct roles of, dierent kinds of theory
oers a somewhat pessimistic outlook for such work to be undertaken. We believe that this leaves
psychologists trying to do science with one arm tied behind their backs - addressing questions of
data collection and theory building from only one aspect of a complementary set of perspectives.
4 Principles, Constructions, Explorations, Confirmations
In the past yearmore vocal critics havewarned that themethodological and analytical changes that
havedrawn themajority attention on this issue (such as registered reports andmore extreme critical
values for statistical hypothesis testing) will not by themselves suice to address the problems of
scientific progress in psychological science. We welcome this more explicit discussion about the
standards of our theories. It is in agreement with those researchers bringing these considerations
to a wider audience that we note in this paper the importance of being aware of the dierent kinds
of roles that theories play in the development of scientific knowledge, and the varying criteria that
are appropriate in the evaluation of distinct forms of theory.
In positioning the present paper within this discussion, however, we should note carefully where
are arguments resonate, and where they dier from others’. Specifically, a set of related-seeming
distinctions have been deployed to get to grips with the theoretical import (or lack thereof) of
certain reforms in psychological science. We wish to be clear in how our work relates, and does not,
to this existing debate. If we simplify the dierence between principle and constructive theories, we
find a distinction that is readily familiar to psychologists, and anyone else versed in the literature on
reforms in scientific practiceover thepast fewyears. Withanemphasis onobservationandopenness
to novel patterns, a caricature of theories of principle might seem like “exploratory research”, with
the sharply focused and hypothesis driven constructive theories being “confirmatory research”.
This mapping is not quite right, however, and should be resisted.
In the first instance, exploratory and confirmatory research are typically defined not by their rela-
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tionship to particular forms of theory, but by a narrow set ofmethodological practices, involving the
prior specification of hypotheses andmodes of analysis (Wagenmakers, Dutilh & Sarafoglou, 2018;
Wagenmakers et al., 2012). The value of this distinction for theory building has been called into ques-
tion (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019; Szollosi & Donkin, 2019), as the key variables that aect the
value of data for evaluation of a theory have little to do with the plans of the researcher, andmore
to do with the logical structure of the theory and its relationship to the observations in question.
Though there is merit in the disciplining of data production and analytic practices, this method-
ological distinction neither fixes the limitations of much psychological research, nor allows for the
kinds of division of labor and complementarity of eort that underlies the principle-constructive
distinction.
Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2019) oer a somewhat dierent pair of categories in the notion of
discovery-oriented vs. theory-testing research. Rather than a dichotomy, however, they suggest
this is a continuum governed not by the specific reporting practices of the scientists, but the prior
probability of a given theory, and the probability of a theory being true given a particular set of
observations. In the case of theory-testing research, the hypotheses in question are logically en-
tailed by the theory being examined. There is a strong logical dependence between them such that
the implications of the observations made in testing the hypotheses bear directly on the structure
or parameters of the theory. In the case of discovery-oriented research the logical relationship is
looser. Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2019) describe hypotheses in discovery-oriented research
being motivated, rather than entailed, by the theory. The theory is much less likely to stand or fall
on the observationsmade, and is consideredmuchmore flexible in response to those observations.
Though thediscovery-oriented vs. theory-testingdistinction gets at the relationshipbetween theory
and data, this remains a dierence of observational or experimental practice. This continuum of
dierence could apply to either theories of principle or constructive theories, and does not (nor is it
intended to) capture the kind of inter-dependency of dierent kinds of knowledge that Einstein’s
description illustrates. Theories of principle are without question the products of exploratory
research, but those explorations are not conducted through a series of statistical hypothesis tests.
It may well be that statistical methods of various kinds will help us bootstrap our recognition of
patterns, be part of a set of tools thatmight enable those of us who fall well short of being a Newton
or Einstein to find some of those important relationships. But the tests, howsoever disciplined,
will not be able to completely replace the abductive logic needed. Indeed, the data of natural
history that we have advocated for here are less concerned with central tendencies, and more with
variation and individualities (Bartholomew, 1986). Tomake progress on this issue we will simply
have to recognise the value of dierent modes of theory, and purposefully undertake programs of
natural historical research, and careful consideration of the data produced.
5 Conclusion: Data follow theories follow data
Theory is the formal structuring of knowledge according to our best understanding of phenomena
in which we are interested. The advancement of scientific knowledge is a matter of the continuous
refinement of theory such that it enables better coordination with the world we experience.
Advancement of knowledge is not a unitary phenomenon, however. It is not a slow march of
progress from ignorance to enlightenment. It is more like way-finding within a complex landscape
of ignorance, certainty, and value; not measured on a single dimension. It is neither simply the
improving accuracy of theories, nor the increasing confidence in the results of statistical tests.
Advancement is multidimensional, depending on the kind of understanding that theories provide,
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and the multifarious values of these dierent theories for dierent purposes. We have outlined in
this paper just two dierent kinds of theories, but also that these dierent theories have dierent
relationships with data, and tend to give dierential roles to dierent kinds of data. Calibrating our
data production practices with theory is thus not a linear process, but one with a feedback loop.
Best methodological practice will depend on our understanding of theories, and those theories will
thus shi as we continued to generate and interpret dierent data. Wemust take great care to avoid
any simple hierarchy of priorities. Reforms of methodological practice must make reference to the
theories that frame them, while calls for improvement in theory must similarly situate themselves
within questions of method.
In this paper we argue that the discipline of psychology, if it can be coherent at all, must begin to re-
emphasize the importance of a natural history of behavior and experience, one that acknowledges
diversity and relationships in addition to norms and averages. Modern psychology would have
some consolation to oer Roger Barker experiencing his negative epiphany on a train journey
through 20th century Illinois, though perhaps much less than we should.
We celebrate the number of psychologists embracing the urgency of reform like never before in the
discipline. We also acknowledge, however, the importance of an open and critical dialogue around
even the most fundamental tenets of that reform, and we urge psychologists to consider carefully
the circular, inter-dependent relationship between theory and practice in the context of a diversity
of theories, and diversity of practices.
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